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Abstract
The paper explores known results related to the problem of identifying
if a given program terminates on all inputs – this is a simple generalization
of the halting problem. We will see how this problem is related and
the notion of proof verifiers. We also see how verifying if a program is
terminating involves reasoning through a tower of axiomatic theories –
such a tower of theories is known as Turing progressions and was first
studied by Alan Turing in the 1930’s. We will see that this process has a
natural connection to ordinal numbers. The paper is presented from the
perspective of a non-expert in the field of logic and proof theory.
1 Introduction
Science can be viewed as the quest for truth. Perhaps there is such a thing as
the ‘whole truth’ and only a small subset of it that we ‘know to be true’ (of
course we are ignoring some falsehoods that we think to be true). Our goal
is to increase the set of truths that we know to cover the whole truth; is this
even possible? (the whole truth may even include deep philosophical truth but
it may not be easy to agree on the definition of such truths.) For simplicity,
we can focus on a set of concrete truths where the definition of truth is fairly
unambiguous; for example, concrete questions such as ‘can one extract energy
from algae efficiently’ or ‘is there a program that quickly solves the travelling
salesman problem’. Different scientific disciplines are interested in truths of
different types: while a phycisist is interested in truths about matter and energy,
a biololigist is more interested in truths about humans and animals, and a
computer scientist about the behavior of programs. Mathematics is interested
in truths about abstract concepts such as numbers, geometric objects. It may
seem that the space of abstract concepts is separate from the physical world but
this is far from true. First, abstract concepts can be used to model things in
the physical world and thus truths in the abstract world can inform us of truths
in the physical world. Further certain objects such as programs can be viewed
as both objects in the physical world and as asbtract mathematical entities.
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Think of a computer program that controls the operation of a catrastrophic
weapon – the question of whether the program reaches a certain state can be
formulated as a mathematical question. Thus theorem proving (finding truths
in mathematics) should be viewed not just as a mental game of puzzle solving
but as in fact it reflects our ability to discover truths in the physical world.
In this paper we will restrict ourselves to truths about programs and further
only to the question of whether a given program terminates or not. It is in
this restricted subet of truths that we will investigate the limits of what we
know and what we can ever know. In mathematics new truths (theorems) are
discovered by the way of proofs. If a truth has no proof we can never know it;
if it has one it is can be known – of course there is the matter of finding the
proof so it is not the case that we can easily know that truth but if we search
hard enough for the proof may be we will find it – thus it is at least knowable.
Thus to understand what truths are knowable we need to understand what is
a proof. In practice, proof checking is a psychological process and naturally an
important question is whether we can understand this process precisely.
The study leads one into a fascinating journey of (known) facts in topics
from Godel’s theorems, ordinal numbers, Turing progressions, and philosophy
of reasoning and knowledge. Perhaps much of the scientific community (except
for the field of proof theory) Godel’s theorem is often understood to mean that
there will always be statements that are true that we will never know to be
true – this however is not really known to be true – all that is known is that a
’mechanical verifier’(a program) can never accepts proofs for all true statements.
From an epistemological perspective though what we can know from a given
set of axioms (such as Peano Arithmetic) turns out to be harder to quantify
– its power is given by a fascinating and little understood phenomena called
Turing progressions which can never be explicitly known to be enumerable.
The significance of Turing progressions and its implications to the concept of
a ’proof’ may have been underplayed in the broad scientific community. The
paper is simply the lessons learnt by a non-expert in the field while exploring
this question – everything here is known already and is the result of discussions
with several people of which at least one is an expert on the topic.
2 The Problem and its difficulty
Which programs terminate and which don’t? This is the question we will study
here. Specifically, we will be interested in checking if a program that takes
inputs terminates on all inputs. This question turns out to be very hard to
answer and its investigation reveals several astonishing facts.
The set of terminating programs is known to be undecidable, non-enumerable
(no Turing machine can list them all), and non-provable in an axiomatic system.
Here is what it means for the set of terminating programs to be decidable,
enumerable and provable.
Decidable: There is a Turing machine that always halts and accepts a program
if and only if it is terminating.
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Enumerable: There is a Turing machine that accepts a program if and only
if it is terminating. It may reject or simply may not halt on other programs.
Clearly to accept terminating programs it must halt at least on those inputs.
Provable (in an axiomatic system): There is an axiomatic system in which
it is possible to prove for each terminating program that it terminates. It should
be possible to build an automated verifier that verifies proofs in this system. It
should not prove a non-terminating machine to be terminating.
Provable (in practice): It is possible to write a paper that proves that a cer-
tain program terminates. Reviewers should accept the proof. The proof should
use as primitive assumptions as possible (such as mathematical induction). A
conservative mathematician may prefer to avoid advanced assumptions such as
continuum hypothesis, or even say the axiom of choice in the proof.
Are the above two notions of provable the same? We will see that the answer
is far from obvious. We will call the programs (Turing machines) of interest as
terminating programs. Such a Turing machine T halts on all inputs x, written
formally as “∀ x Halts(T,x)” We will say Terminating(T) := ∀x Halts(T,x). Let
Ω = {T: Terminating(T) }. Thus Ω is the set of all terminating programs.
Theorem 1 The set Ω is not decidable and not enumerable.
Given a finitely axiomatized theory, one can write a verifier (a program)
that verifies proofs in that theory. Thus given a theorem and a proof as strings
the verifier can check if it is a valid proof in that theory and if it results in
the theorem which will usually be the last statement in the proof. If a verifier
accepts a proof of the statement “Terminating(T)” then for convenience we
will say that it accepts the program T (it can do this non-deterministically by
guessing the proof). We will say the verifier is correct if it does not accept any
program outside Ω. Thus for our purpose a verifier is defined as follows:
Definition 2 A verifier is a program that takes as input a proof, turing machine
pair (pi, T) and checks if pi correctly proves that T is a terminating program
in a certain axiomitic system. If it accepts (pi,T) then T must be in Ω. The
verifier must halt on all inputs (pi, T).
Go¨del’s theorems [17] can be used to infer some properties of the set of
programs accepted by a verifier. The following theorem is a direct consequence
(rather a restatement) of Go¨del’s theorems.
Theorem 3 [Go¨del]
• In any finitely axiomatizable proof system with a proof verifier, all ma-
chines in Ω cannot be proved to be terminating unless it proves a machine
outside Ω to be terminating.
• Further, given the code for a verifier V, one can explicitly write the code
for another program P that is not proven to be terminating by V but is in
Ω.
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In fact, given a verifier V, one can always write another verifier S(V) that is
strictly stronger than V, in the sense that it accepts more terminating programs
– here S is a deterministic function that obtains one verifier from another.
In a philosophical essay “Minds, Machines and Go¨del,” Lucas [22, 23] sug-
gested that Go¨del’s theorems show that the human mind is more powerful than
machines. This paper was heavily debated, heavily praised and criticized. Ma-
jor supporters included Penrose [26, 27, 28]; some of the major critics were
Hofstadter and Franze´n[18, 15]. Regardless of the points of the debate (see
[19, 8, 7, 30, 15] as a small sample of the arguments), the following statements
seem to be correct consequences of Go¨del’s theorem (we refer to these as state-
ments and not theorems as they talk about people.)
Statement 4 (Go¨del) If a person’s reasoning can be modeled by a Turing ma-
chine, then there is some machine in Ω that (s)he will not know to be terminat-
ing.
Another way to think of Go¨del’s theorem is as follows. Note that as stated
before a verifier can be viewed as a Turing machine that accepts a subset of Ω
(if a verifier verifies proofs, then we will simply look at the subset of Ω that can
be proven to be terminating under that verifier). A verifier V is maximal in a
set of verifiers if no other verifier accepts a program to be terminating that is
not already proven to be terminating by V.
Theorem 5 [Go¨del]
• There is no maximal verifier. The set of verifiers is not enumerable.
• Any reasonable belief system does not have a maximal trusted verifier.
Here a belief system is simply a collection of statements. A ‘trusted’ verifier
means that the belief system knows that whatever the verifier accepts is true.
Informally, the above theorem says.
Statement 6 (Go¨del) A reasonable mathematician cannot point to a single
Turing machine and claim that it enumerates all programs that (s)he believes
to be terminating. For every Turing machine that enumerates terminating pro-
grams, (s)he can point to a better Turing machine that enumerates more termi-
nating programs.
This brings us to an important question: what process do mathematicians
follow in accepting proofs? Is it a Turing machine? Is it certain that there
are programs what we will never know to be terminating? Does there exist
a terminating program for which we can never write a (correct) paper that
proves it to be so? To understand the complexity of these questions, we must
first understand the essential ideas (next section) behind Go¨del’s theorems. In
section 4 we will look at an interesting phenomena called Turing progressions
that allows one to construct infinitely many (in fact we may even say transfinitely
many) verifiers from a single verifier. We will see how such progression of
verifiers is related to ordinal numbers – numbers beyond natural numbers. We
summarize our conclusions about the questions posed above in section 5.
4
3 Understanding Go¨dels argument
We will now prove theorem 3 (theorem 5 follows from the same ideas and is
proven in the appendix.) The main idea is that given any correct verifier that
accepts the set of programs Ω0 ⊂ Ω, one can construct a terminating program
not in Ω0; and then one can obtain a better(stronger) verifier that accepts
everything in Ω0 and the new terminating program. The new program that one
can show to be terminating is very simple. The proof uses diagonalization to
construct a function that is different from each of the functions in an enumerable
set of functions. We will work with programs that return a boolean value upon
termination. Given a verifier V, a program T, and a proof pi that proves that
T is terminating, we will use V(pi,T) to denote if V accepts the proof pi as a
proof of the statement “Terminating(T)”. Thus V(pi,T) is also a boolean value.
We will use the terms Turing machines and programs interchangeably.
This following program on input x, checks if x represents a proof, Turing
machine pair “(pi, T)” such that pi correctly proves to V that T is a terminating.
If not it exits; otherwise, it returns the opposite of T(x). We will prove that
this program is outside the set of programs accepted by V to be terminating.
P = "function P(x)
{
Let "($pi, $T)" = x
// i.e., parse the input x to check if it forms a proof, Turing machine pair.
// If so, store the Turing machine in the variable T and proof in pi
// We use $T, $pi to denote the literal strings present in the
// variables T and pi respectively (in Perl style syntax)
// If this is not possible return anything
if (V(pi,T))
{
// That is, check if the verifier accepts the Turing machine , proof pair.
// The proof certifies the statement "\forall x Halts($T,x)" to V.
// That is the machine with code
// represented by string $T is terminating.
return not T(x) // that is, return the opposite of T(x)
}
else
return 0.
}"
Claim 7 If V is a correct verifier, the program P always halts. Further it is not
accepted by V (that is there is no proof of P to be terminating that is accepted
by V)
Proof: The claim is a standard diagonalization argument.
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The program checks if x is a pair (pi,T) where T is a Turing machine and
pi proves to V that T always halts. Only if it passes the check, does it execute
T(x). Thus the only reason it may not halt is that T does not halt. But T is
proven to be halting by V. So this cannot happen.
The above program is different from every program accepted by V. To see
this note that if T is accepted by V, then P differs from T on at least one input
namely “(pi,T)” where pi is the proof that T is a terminating program.
4 New Verifiers from Old: Turing Progressions
Given that one can obtain a program P from a verifier V, we will show how
one can get a sequence of verifiers each better(stronger) than the previous one.
One way to think of the verifier is that, instead of accepting valid proofs, it is a
non-deterministic program that accepts theorems provable in the theory – this
is achieved by simply making the verifier “guess” the proof of a given theorem
it is checking for provability. Thus the (non deterministic) verifier accepts all
theorems provable in the theory. Given such a verifier for a theory, since we
are only interested in statements of the form “∀x Halts(T,x)”, we can modify it
into a program that accepts T if and only if V (as a non deterministic program)
accepts the statement “∀x Halts(T,x)”. Thus the modified program accepts
some subset Ω0 ⊂ Ω assuming the original theory was correct.
Given a (deterministic) verifier for proofs, one can (programmatically) con-
vert it into a non-deterministic verifier that accepts provable statements and
vice versa (from the non deterministic verifier, the proof is simply the set of
non deterministic bits). As a deterministic verifier we will used the notation
V(pi,T) to denote if V accepts pi as a proof of T to be a terminating program.
When we view the same verifier as a non-deterministic verifier we will use the
notation V(T) to indicate if it accepts T as a terminating program – it will
non-deterministically guess the proof pi if one exists. In this section we will use
the latter notation.
As shown in the previous section, given a verifier V, we can write a program
P that is terminating but is not accepted by V. But now that we know P is a
terminating program we can construct a better verifier that accepts all machines
accepted by V and also accepts the program P. Note that even though the theory
on which the initial verifier was based (say for example Peano Arithmetic) did
not “know” that P is a terminating program, we do know this if we believe in
the correctness of the theory. Thus if we were to write down the above proof in a
paper we would not expect a reviewer to object to the proof and the conclusion
that P terminates.
This gives us a method to getter better verifiers from old ones. Let S(V)
denote the better verifier.
S(V) = "
function S(V) (x)
{
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if (x== $P)
return TRUE;
else
return V(x);
}"
Thus the above verifier accepts everything that V accepts and also accepts
the program P. So if we use L(V ) to denote the language accepted by a verifier
V, then Ω0 = L(V ) and we know that if Ω1 = L(S(V )) accepts a larger subset
so Ω0 ( Ω1. Thus we get:
Claim 8 If V is a verifier, then S(V) is a strictly stronger verifier; that is, it
accepts a larger subset of terminating programs than V.
Instead of just adding one program P to the set of programs accepted by
V, we could do something smarter. We could add an axiom to the axioms of
V that will allow it to accept the new program P. One way to prove that the
program P is terminating is to assume that whatever program V proves to be
terminating is terminating. Usually a verifier accepts proofs based on some
axioms and deduction rules – we can put a wrapper around it so that it only
accepts programs that can be proven to be terminating with those axioms. So
we could add the new axiom R = “∀x Accepts(V,x) → Terminating(x)”. If
this was available to a verifier as an axiom it can derive the statement “∀x
Halts(P,x)” as long as it has the basic axioms of arithmetic and axioms to prove
properties of programs and the deduction rule of Modus Ponens. Modus ponens
is the prime deduction rule in most axiom systems – it says that if “x” and “x→
y” can be derived then “y” can also be derived. So using modus ponens, from
R, one can derive the statement “∀x Halts(T,x)” for any T that is known t be
terminating. Hence one can formally deduce that P is also always terminating.
The statement R denotes what is called as 1-consistency in proof theory. In this
case we will implement S as follows: S(V) = Verifier obtained by adding the
statement “∀x Accepts(V,x) → Terminating(x)” as new axiom to the axioms of
V. S can be formally written as a program just like the previous one.
Thus S can be viewed as a function that takes a function (verifier) as an in-
put and outputs a new function. Starting from V0 = V , we can get V1 = S(V ),
V2 = S(V1),...,Vi = S
i(V ). Even though the each Vi accepts more terminating
machines than V0, the above arguments show that they all accept only termi-
nating programs. In fact for any fixed i, one can write down an explicit proof
of its correctness in a way that would be acceptable to any mathematician who
believes in the correctness of the base verifier (if you ask: in which axiomatic
system is the proof written, the response would be: think like a person reviewing
the proof not like a Turing machine.) But we can even write a single verifier VB
(where B is used a symbol for a very BIG number greater than every natural
number) that accepts the union of all these verifiers. That is L(VB) = ∪i∈NL(Vi)
The code for VB looks like this:
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V_B = "
function V_B (x)
{
i = some natural number chosen non-deterministically;
return V(i)(x)
}
function V(i) {
if (i==0) return V;
else return S(V(i-1))
}
}"
.
But then now can define S(VB), S(S(VB)), ...., S
i(VB). Let’s denote these
by VB+i. One can write a program for each of these verifiers. Not only that we
can actually write a program that enumerates all these verifiers and accepts all
their proofs giving us the new verifier VB+B or let’s call it VB.2. Then we can
get VB.3, .., VB.i. Finally we can enumerate all these and write a single verifier
VB.B that accepts their union. Continuing this way we get
V0, V1, ...., VB, VB+1, VB+2, ...VB.2, VB.3, VB.4, VB.i, ..
VB.B.., VB.B.B, .., VBi , ....VBB , VBBB , ....VBBB
..i times , ...V
BB
B..B times .....
Note that VB can be viewed as a verifier enumerator as it essentially enumerates
all previous verifiers. VB.(i+1) is obtained from VB.i by writing a higher level
function that translates one verifier enumerator into another. Similarly we get
VB.B by writing a program for a verifier enumerator enumerator. VBi is a verifier
enumerator to the ith degree. VBB enumerates all verifier enumerators of any
finite degree. Anyone with some familiarity with ordinal numbers will see the
pattern here. This progression of theories is called Turing progressions. Alan
Turing looked at such progressions in some papers 1937-1940 [29]. This was later
taken up by Solomon Feferman [9, 10] around 1960 and logicians Beklemishev
[2] and Artemov [1] more recently. The main principle used in formalizing such a
progression is to assume some notion of the consistency (called as 1-consistency)
of the previous theory in the next theory. By Go¨del’s theorem the consistency of
the theory given by a verifier V (which is akin to the statement “∀x Accepts(V,x)
→ Terminating(x)”) is not provable by V. Assuming this consistency (which
doesn’t really seem like an assumption) is called as the reflection principle in
proof theory.
Ordinal numbers: Ordinal numbers [25, 6] are extensions of natural numbers
introduced by Cantor to talk about infinite sequences The finite ordinals are
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the natural numbers: 0, 1, 2, ,. Each number in this sequence can be viewed as
the size of the set of all the numbers before it. Next, we need a number that
denotes the size of the set of all the natural numbers and we denote this by the
least infinite ordinal ω. Next we have ω+1,..,ω+2,.... Next we get ω.2 which is
the least ordinal that is greater than all ordinals of the form ω + i. Continuing
this way we get
1, 2, ..., ω, ω + 1, ω + 2, ..., ω.2, ω.2 + 1, ..., ω2, ..., ω3, ..., ωω, ..., ωω
ω
, ..., ωω
ω
.
.
, ...
At some point you will get an ordinal number that represents the size of
an uncountable set. We will say an ordinal is countable if the set of ordinals
less than it (in the sequence) is countable. Some ordinals are simply obtained
by adding 1 to the previous ordinals; others such as ω are called limit ordinals
– one cannot really point to a unique ordinal just before ω. How should we
denote or visualize ordinals beyond the ones written above? This in itself is
a very difficult question and has ramifications into questions related to Turing
progressions. For our purposes, we can view the code of the verifiers that we
get as a natural notation for some of the initial ordinal numbers ( this idea
was suggested by Fefferman ). For a limit ordinal, as long as we can explicitly
enumerate the verifiers before that point, we can write the code for the verifier
corresponding to that ordinal.
Can we get verifiers for every countable ordinal? Apparently not; the highest
ordinal for which we hope to get a verifier is bounded by something called
the Church-Kleene ordinal [25] – ordinals less than this are called computable
ordinals. It is known how to get notations and corresponding verifiers up to
some ordinal in this sequence way way below the Church-Kleene ordinal. But
beyond that the questions are open. The more notations or verifiers we find
the larger the subset of Ω we know to be terminating. Now, it is known that
if we had a good notation or verifier for every computable ordinal, we could
in fact cover all of Ω – that is we would be able to prove all the terminating
programs (Turing-Fefferman Completeness theorems [9]). But unfortunately we
do not know how to express the higher ordinals beyond a certain point well. Is
the (good) notation of ordinals beyond a certain point known to be impossible?
No. But Beklemishev says it seems difficult and may even be unlikely.
Another interesting question is whether it is possible to get richer theories
from simpler ones by applying the reflection principle repeatedly; for example
can one get ZFC (Zermelo Fraenkel set theory) from PA (Peano Arithmetic)
at a certain ordinal? This question is studied by Beklemishev in [2]. It turns
out that using natural orinal notations, one can go very far constructing the
tower without ever reaching ZFC. We get at ZFC at an ordinal that is called
as the “proof-theoretic Π02-ordinal of ZFC”, but it is not known how big it
is (there are only some known lower bounds). It is considered, perhaps, the
most important open question in classical proof-theory. However, people have
analysed and computed similar ordinals exactly for some other, rather strong,
axiomatic systems. There is a whole science of computing such ordinals called
“proof-theoretic ordinal analysis” (see [2] and the references there in) .
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For further exploration of this rich and mysterious phenomena of Turing
progressions the reader is directed to [9, 10, 13, 14, 2, 3] (warning: if you are
not familiar with proof theory, reading the literature may a daunting task).
5 Summary
Here are some of the conclusions we can draw from the arguments presented so
far.
• Is there a program that decides if a certain program is terminating? No.
• Is there a single program that for every terminating program can accept
a proof that it terminates? No.
• For every verifier that accepts proofs for some subset of terminating pro-
grams to be terminating, can one always write a better more powerful
verifier to do so? Yes.
• Can people provably and correctly know any given non-terminating pro-
grams to be non-terminating? We don’t know.
• Can people write a program and claim that the program enumerates all
terminating programs that people know to be terminating? No.
• Are people more powerful than programs when it comes to knowing if a
program is terminating or not? We don’t know.
• Do we understand the process by which people accept proofs of a program
to be terminating? Don’t think so. But we do seem to be able to execute
the process.
Acknowledgements
The paper resulted out of my wanderings into questions about provably halting
programs and owes much to discussions with several people. I am grateful to
Lev Beklemishev for explaining known facts about Turing progressions and for
reviewing a draft of this paper – much of the details about Turing progressions
presented here came directly from those discussions. I am also grateful to Sergey
Yekhanin who gave a patient ear to my myriad confused arguments related to
this topic. I would also like to thank Herman Ruge Jervell for telling me that
the progression of theories is called Turing progressions and for pointing me to
Lev’s work. Finally I would like to thank Toni Pitassi, Mark Braverman, Ran
Raz, Gil Segev, and Alex Andoni for useful and interesting discussions about
a certain ‘series of proof verifiers’ that seemed to come from one verifier – in
hindsight this simply turned out to be the Turing progressions.
10
References
[1] S. N. Artemov, On Explicit Reflection in Theorem Proving and Formal
Verification , Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 1999, Volume 1632,1999,
678, DOI: 10.1007,3-540-48660-7 23
[2] L. Beklemishev. Proof-theoretic analysis by iterated reflection. Archive for
Mathematical Logic 42 (6), 515-552 (2003).
[3] L. Beklemishev, Induction rules, reflection principles, and provably recur-
sive functions. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, 85, 193-242. (1997)
[4] G.S. Boolos, Introductory note to: some basic theorems on the foundations
of mathematics and their implications, in: Collected Works III, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, UK, 1995, pp. 290304.
[5] G.S. Boolos, R.C. JeMrey, Computability and Logic, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, UK, 1989
[6] Cantor, G., (1897), Beitrage zur Begrundung der transfiniten Mengenlehre.
II (tr.: Contributions to the Founding of the Theory of Transfinite Numbers
II), Mathematische Annalen 49, 207-246
[7] D Chalmers, Minds, machines, and mathematics - Psyche, 1995
[8] S Bringsjord, K Arkoudas, The modal argument for hypercomputing minds
- Theoretical Computer Science, 2004 - Elsevier
[9] S Feferman, Transfinite recursive progressions of axiomatic theories- Jour-
nal of Symbolic Logic, 1962
[10] S Feferman, Reflecting on incompleteness - Journal of Symbolic Logic, 1991
[11] S Feferman, Three conceptual problems that bug me, Unpublished lecture
text for 7th Scandinavian Logic Symposium, Uppsala, 1996. Available at
http://math.stanford.edu/~feferman/papers/conceptualprobs.pdf.
[12] S Feferman, C Spector, Incompleteness along paths in progressions of the-
ories - Journal of Symbolic Logic, 1962
[13] T. Franze´n. Inexhaustibility: A Non-Exhaustive Treatment.Wellesley ,Mas-
sachusetts
[14] T. Franze´n, Transfinite progressions: a second look at completeness - Bul-
letin of Symbolic Logic, 2004
[15] Torkel Franze´n. Go¨del’s Theorem: An Incomplete Guide to its Use and
Abuse. Wellesley, Mass.: AK Peters, 2005. x+ 172 pp. ISBN1 56881 238 8.
[16] J.E. Fenstad, On the completeness of some transfinite recursive progressions
of axiomatic theories- Journal of Symbolic Logic, 1968
11
[17] Go¨dels Incompleteness Theorems. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%
C3%B6del’s_incompleteness_theorems
[18] D. Hofstadter, Waking up from the Boolean dream, in: Metamagical The-
mas: Questing for the Essence of Mind and Matter, Bantam, New York,
NY, 1985, pp. 661665.
[19] M. Kerber, Why Is the Lucas-Penrose Argument Invalid? - KI 2005: Ad-
vances in Artificial Intelligence, 2005
[20] P. Kugel, Thinking may be more than computing, Cognition 18 (1986)
128149.
[21] H. Lewis, C. Papadimitriou, Elements of the Theory of Computation,
Prentice-Hall, Englewood CliMs, NJ, 1981.
[22] J.R. Lucas, Minds, machines, and Go¨del, in: A.R. Anderson (Ed.), Minds
and Machines, Prentice-Hall, Englewood CliMs, NJ, 1967, pp. 4359 (Lucas
paper is available online at http://users.ox.ac.uk/jrlucas/mmg.html).
[23] J.R. Lucas, Minds, machines, and G7odel: a retrospect, in: P. Millican, A.
Clark (Eds.), Machines and Thought: The Legacy of Alan Turing, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, UK, 1996, pp. 103124.
[24] Minsky, Marvin L., Computation: finite and infinite machines, 1967, ISBN
0-13-165563-9, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Upper Saddle River, NJ, USA
[25] Ordinal Numbers, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ordinal_number.
Large Countable Ordinals. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Large_
countable_ordinal
[26] R. Penrose, The Emperors New Mind, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
UK, 1989.
[27] R. Penrose, Shadows of the Mind, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK,
1994.
[28] R. Penrose, Beyond the doubting of a shadow: a reply to commentaries
on Shadows of the Mind, Psyche 2 (3) (1996), This is an electronic publi-
cation. It is available at http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/ v2/psyche-2-23-
penrose.html.
[29] A. M. Turing Systems of Logic Based on Ordinals Proc. London Math. Soc.
1939 s2-45: 161-228. Available online at http://www.turingarchive.org.
[30] C Wright, Intuitionists are not (Turing) machines - Philosophia Mathemat-
ica, 1995
12
A Proof of theorem 5
The first part of the theorem follows from the fact that for every verifier one can
construct a better verifier. Note that the set of verifiers cannot be enumerable
as otherwise there is a single verifier that can enumerate them all and capture
their combined power. We now formalize the second part and prove it.
Let a belief system B denote a subset of statements in some language. These
are interpreted to be the set of statements that are believed to be true by a
person. V is a verifier in B if it accepts programs and for every program P
accepted by V, the statement “Terminating(P)” is in B. V is a trusted verifier
if the statement “∀x Accepts(V,x) → Terminating(x)” is in B. Let Trusted(V)
:= ∀x Accepts(V,x) → Terminating(x)
Assume all statements have balanced parenthesis and may be removed if
there is no ambiguity. A belief system is reasonable if it is closed under the
following axioms/deduction rules:
1. Modus Ponens (MP)
2. Trusted($V) → Terminating($P) where P is code for the program defined
earlier that depends on the code from V.
This says that if V is a trusted verifier the program P is also believed to
be terminating.
3. Terminating($P) → Trusted($V) where V = “V(x){ if x=“$P” return
TRUE else FALSE}”
This says that if a program P is believed to be terminating then a verifier
that only accepts P is a trusted verifier.
Theorem 9 A reasonable and correct belief system doesn’t have a maximal
trusted verifier
Proof: Consider any trusted verifier V; we will show that it cannot be
maximal. Let T(V) be the set of programs T accepted by the verifier V (to
be terminating.) Look at the program P. It is different from every machine in
T(V). So P is not in T(V). But since V is trusted, from axiom 2 (and MP),
we know that statement S ∈ B. Also by axiom 3, (and MP) there is a trusted
verifier that accepts S. So V cannot be maximal.
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